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Abstract
This study presents the ﬁrst analyses of the equity of health care ﬁ-
nancing in Iran. Kakwani Progressivity Indices (KPIs) and concentra-
tion indices (CIs) are estimated using ten national household expendi-
ture surveys, which were conducted in Iran from 1995/96 to 2004/05.
The indices are used to analyze the progressivity of two sources of
health care ﬁnancinghealth insurance premium payments and con-
sumer co-payments (and the sum of these)for Iran as a whole, and
for rural and urban areas of Iran, separately. The results suggest that
health insurance premium payments became more progressive over the
study period; however the KPIs for consumer co-payments suggest
that these are still mildly regressive or slightly progressive, depending
upon whether household income or expenditure data are used to gen-
erate the indices. Interestingly, the Urban Inpatient Insurance Scheme
(UIIS), which was introduced by the Iranian government in 2000 to
extend insurance to uninsured urban dwellers, appears to have had a
regressive impact on health care ﬁnancing, which is contrary to expec-
tations. This result sounds a cautionary note about the potential for
public programs to crowd out private sector, charitable activity, which
was prevalent in Iran prior to the introduction of the UIIS.
Keywords: Equity, Health care ﬁnancing, Kakwani progressivity index, Iran.
JEL codes: D31, D63, I18, P43.
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1 Introduction
Health sector equity is widely regarded as an important policy objective
(O'Donnell et al. 2007) and one against which the performance of health
care systems is often evaluated (Lairson et al. 1995). Some authors have
gone so far as to suggest that equity concerns ought to predominate other
health sector goals, including that of eﬃciency (Mooney 1986). Irrespective
of one's normative position, the positive economic analysis of distributional
concerns in the health sector has been of considerable interest to economists,
policy-makers and others in recent years (Wagstaﬀ et al. 2000; Wilkinson
1995). The distributions of health care ﬁnancing contributions in European
countries and the United States (Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer 1992; Wagstaﬀ
et al. 1999) and Australia (Lairson et al. 1995) have now been analysed; and
recently, O'Donnell et al. (2008) provided the ﬁrst empirical estimates for
a number of Asian territories. To date, though, there has been no analysis
of the health care ﬁnancing distribution in middle-eastern countries. This
paper provides the ﬁrst such evidence, for Iran.
In Iran, Article 29 of the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right of
access to health care. Thus, the letter of the law suggests that the provision
of health care to the entire Iranian population must be one of the Iranian
government's focal points. Although such decrees are subject to the usual
vagaries (of interpretation, etc.), it may also be argued that the government
of Iran has taken a number of steps in recent years to improve access to health
care. Indeed, greater equity in health care ﬁnancing is a stated goal of the
Iranian government, as articulated in the Law of the Fourth Economic, Social
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and Cultural Development Plan (Management and Planning Organization of
Iran 2004). The modern reforms to health care ﬁnancing in Iran began in
the mid-1990s, and largely have involved the extension of health insurance
coverage to large proportions of the rural and the urban Iranian population
that were previously uninsured. Indeed, it can now be said that, since 2005,
most Iranians have had insurance for both hospital and out-of-hospital care.
During the preceding decade, the Iranian government embarked on a
range of initiatives that were designed to improve insurance coverage, which
included the introduction of insurance for hospital services for the urban unin-
sured (approximately 10 per cent of Iran's population), and the introduction
of insurance covering in- and out-of-hospital services for the rural population
(about 30 per cent of the Iranian population). Indeed, the main gap in insur-
ance coverage in Iran is now out-of-hospital services for the (formerly) urban
uninsured who do not have insurance for out-of-hospital services (such as
GP services). On the other hand, a publicly funded and supplied primary
health care (PHC) program exists in Iran, and is available at zero price to
Iranians. Thus, although health insurance coverage in Iran is not univer-
sal, it is fairly close to being so when purchases of insurance policies and
public health care ﬁnancing programs are taken together. The concomitant
growth of the health sector in Iran is apparent in the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) National Health Accounts (NHAs), which record an increase
in health expenditure from 4.9% of GDP in 1996 to 7.8 % of GDP in 2005
(WHO 2008).
In this article, we provide the ﬁrst measures of equity in health care
ﬁnancing for Iran. Reliable data on the health sector are diﬃcult to ob-
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tain directly from the Iranian government. So, instead we use household
income and expenditure survey data for 1995-1996 to 2004-2005 to examine
the progressivity of health care ﬁnancing, and to decompose our estimates to
examine the progressivity of health insurance premium payments and con-
sumer co-payments for medical care over this period. Hence we are able
not only to produce the ﬁrst estimates of equity of health care ﬁnancing in
Iran, but also to track changes in the progressivity of health care ﬁnancing,
by source. This time-series dimension to the work is particularly interesting
given the government's stated focus on equity in health care ﬁnancing policy
over this period and the rapid health expenditure growth that occurred in
Iran over the study period. Moreover, we are able to examine progressivity
in both rural and urban populations separately. This is important because
the Iranian government's policies have speciﬁcally addressed the problem
of uninsured rural and urban dwellers, separately, with qualitatively- and
temporally-distinct policy initiatives.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of health
care ﬁnancing and delivery in Iran, along with a discussion of recent govern-
ment initiatives to improve health insurance coverage and our hypotheses
regarding their eﬀects; Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and methods;
Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Health Care Financing and Delivery in Iran:
A Brief Overview
Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of Iran's health care ﬁnancing
and delivery arrangements.
The top half of Figure 1 indicates the institutional arrangements in Iran's
health care ﬁnancing system. Although all Iranians are now formally insured
for inpatient hospital treatment, there are numerous health insurance carri-
ers and these include both government and independent organizations. The
government organizations include the Medical Service Insurance Organiza-
tion (MSIO), the Social Security Organization (SSO) and the Armed Forces
Medical Service Organization (AFMSO). The independent organizations in-
clude oil companies, radio and television broadcasters, banks, and so on that
provide health insurance for their employees.1 Generally speaking, health
insurance is employer-based, in the sense that government employees are cov-
ered by government organisations and that employees of larger independent
organisations tend to be covered by their employer. Small business opera-
tors, sole traders and so on, may also purchase an insurance policy from the
MSIO or the SSO. Purchased insurance policies typically cover both in- and
out-of-hospital services, however the MSIO coverage that is extended to ur-
ban dwellers who have not purchased a policy does not cover out-of-hospital
services. Since 2005, the insurance that has been extended to Iran's rural
population has covered both in- and out-of-hospital services and is identi-
1According to the Iranian Constitution, the latter independent organisations are,
nevertheless, public property.
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Figure 1: The Iranian Health Care Financing and Delivery Systems
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cal to the coverage obtained by employees and others who purchase cover
directly.
Insurers in Iran receive insurance premium revenue from their members,
but they also receive government support, which is derived from general tax-
ation revenue as well as the sale of natural resources (e.g., oil). They may also
receive individual donations and bequests. According to the World Health
Organization (2008) NHAs government expenditures account for approxi-
mately 50 per cent of health care ﬁnancing in Iran, while private sources
(i.e., private insurance premiums and consumer co-payments) account for
the remaining 50 per cent of health expenditure. A very important point to
make, in this regard is that, according to The Central Bank of the Islamic
Republic of Iran (2009) in the last decade, on average, only about 30% of
government derived from taxation. The remaining 70% was derived from the
sale of natural resources, principally, oil. Thus, the equity picture that we
are able to draw by focusing only on private health care ﬁnancing in Iran is
not as skewed as it would be if greater general tax revenue were raised by
taxes levied on the population.
The boxes in the lower half of Figure 1 indicate the main components of
the Iranian health care delivery system and the arrows to their right indicate
ﬂows of funds from two sources: insurers and the MOHME. The insurer
payments represent expenditures for services rendered to their insureds and
payments from the MOHME (via the Universities of Medical Sciences) to
public hospitals, health centres, diagnostic centres and pharmacies. With the
exception of the (primary) health centres, the revenue streams of each of the
services just listed include both direct government grants via the MOHME
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and insurance company payments from the entities at the top of Figure 1.
Note that all of the health care delivery entities in the lower half of Figure 1
receive consumer co-payments, which are denoted by the solid arrows to the
left of the boxes.
The only health care delivery entity type in Figure 1 that receives zero
payments from health insurers is health centres, which are ﬁnanced and run
by the MOHME. This has been a central feature of the Iranian health care
system since the Islamic Revolution in 1979: traditionally, the government
had relied heavily on its Primary Health Care (PHC) systemwhich all
Iranians are entitled to useto pursue its equity goals in the health sec-
tor. This system involves the widespread use of low-cost, eﬀective primary
care services. These services include community health education, prenatal
care, family planning, nutritional care and education, immunization, school
hygiene, dental health, environmental health and so on, as well as the treat-
ment of some conditions. The services are delivered by units that are called
health posts in urban areas and health houses in rural areas. Impor-
tantly, these entities, which are the ﬁrst contact point in the health system,
also control referrals to the second level of the health system (which we refer
to as secondary health care), which is made up of Rural and Urban Health
Centres, where a GP provides medical services to referred patients. These
centres, in turn, refer patients to District-level hospitals and to (the more
prestigious) University of Medical Sciences hospitals, which constitute the
tertiary components of the Iranian health care system.
As Figure 1 shows, the institutional expenditure on secondary and ter-
tiary health care services in Iran derives from health insurance. Thus, the
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gaps in health insurance coverage that existed prior to reforms that were
introduced between 1995 and 2005 primarily aﬀected services produced by
the secondary and tertiary components of the Iranian health care system.
2.1 Reforms in Iranian Health Care Financing and Hy-
pothesised Eﬀects
2.1.1 Reforms
One important step by the government, in its eﬀort to extend insurance
coverage, was the introduction of the Public Medical Service Insurance Cov-
erage Act (PMSICA). This Act, which was implemented in September 1995,
established the MSIO. The MSIO's remit was to provide formal health in-
surance coverage to people from a range of occupations, social strata and
circumstances, including civil servants, village dwellers, decamping tribes,
the self-employed, people with disabilities, university students, released cap-
tives and the families of individuals who the Iranian authorities recognised
as martyrs.
In 2000, the government then introduced an initiative called the Urban
Inpatient Insurance Scheme (UIIS). The purpose of the UIIS was to subsidize
inpatient health care for Iranians who live in urban areas but do not hold
health insurance. This initiative extended health insurance to approximately
10 per cent of the Iranian population.
Finally, in 2005, the Iranian government announced the extension of in-
surance to the 30 percent of Iran's population that lives in rural areas. As
was mentioned previously, rural Iranians now have insurance for primary-
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through-tertiary health care services, and their policy inclusions and condi-
tions are essentially identical to those who have an insurance policy purchased
from their insurer or the MSIO. Unfortunately, the available household survey
data do not enable us to observe the eﬀects of this policy on the progressivity
of health care ﬁnancing. Thus, we restrict our attention to measuring the
progressivity of health care ﬁnancing and the impact, if any, of the UIIS over
the time series.
2.1.2 Hypothesised Eﬀects
Initiatives such as the UIIS may be expected to increase the progressivity of
health care ﬁnancing in urban areas of Iran. Thus, one may hypothesise that
the KPIs for urban areas will increase in magnitude (i.e., become less strongly
negative or more positive), ceteris paribus, following the introduction of the
UIIS. Relaxing the ceteris paribus assumption complicates matters, particu-
larly when one considers the possibility that the UIIS may have also resulted
in some crowding out of charitable behaviour. In particular, charitable organ-
isations which provide support to the poor and uninsured predate the UIIS
reforms: the role for these organisations in assisting the urban uninsured
presumably changed with the introduction of the UIIS and could be expected
to lead to crowding out.2 Furthermore, if the UIIS aﬀected the behaviour of
urban medical providers, either in respect of the prices charged to the poor
and uninsured for their services, or their propensity to refer the uninsured
for hospital treatment, this may attenuate the progressivity of the impact of
2Of course, if such charities were crowded out of urban areas, but into rural areas, the
progressivity of health care ﬁnancing in rural areas could improve.
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the reforms where total health care expenditure and out-of-pocket payments,
in particular, are concerned. Finally, if the urban uninsured were not, on av-
erage, relatively poor the impact of the policy could be neutral or regressive.
Unfortunately, we cannot control for such variables in our analysis: data on
these potential confounders are not available.
In summary, we hypothesise that health care ﬁnancing in Iran will have
become more progressive over the study period, at least in urban areas.
A converse (more regressive) or neutral result on the estimated KPIs and
CIs over time could arise if crowding out, behavioural, or other confounders
prevail.
3 Data
As was described in Section 2, public and private expenditures on health
care in Iran account for approximately equal (i.e., 50/50) shares of the total.
Public expenditures are ﬁnanced mostly via the sales of natural resources
and from other sources of government revenue, including income taxation.
Unfortunately, reliable data on public health expenditure do not exist. Pri-
vate expenditures on health care take the form of consumer co-payments
and health insurance premium payments. Fortunately, high-quality data are
available on private expenditures on health care by household, via the House-
hold Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES). These surveys are collected
and published annually by the Iranian Statistics Centre from 1995/96 to
2004/05, for both rural and urban areas.
The data include measures of household income and detailed disaggre-
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gations of household expenditure data on a variety of goods and services,
including health care. Importantly, the health care expenditure measures
capture consumer co-payments and payments of health insurance premiums
separately, enabling us to disaggregate our inequality measures for these two
sources.
The HIES are based on a two-step sampling approach in which house-
holds, which constitute the sampling unit, are randomly selected from all
parts of the country. In the ﬁrst step, the number of blocks and villages
required for representative sampling in every province is estimated using the
following formula:
nch =
1
m
[
Z0.05Sch
BchXch
]2
Deff (1)
where c indicates the variable of interest, h indexes the province, m is
the number of households in the sampling block (which, in turn, is set equal
to ﬁve in rural areas and 100 in urban areas), sch indicates the estimated
standard deviation of the variable, Bch is the p-value, Xch is the estimated
mean of c and Deff is the (cluster sample) design eﬀect. The latter is an esti-
mate of the factor by which the number of sampling units (households in this
case) required must increase due to the cluster sampling design, compared
with a simple random sample.3 In the second step, the sampling units
the householdsare chosen using the systematic circle method (Statistical
Center of Iran 2005).
Data at the level of the individual are not available to us, so we take the
3For the Iranian HIES the Deff =1.2.
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household as the unit of observation in this study.
4 Methods
The concept of an equitable distribution of health expenditure is, of course, a
normative one. The actual distribution of health expenditure is, on the other
hand, a positive matter. Our purpose is to conduct a positive analysis of
health expenditures in Iran. We do this by estimating Kakwani progressivity
indices (KPIs), which can be used to quantify the progressivity/regressivity
of health care ﬁnancing using the available data. This approach, which has
been used commonly in health economics (Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer 2000)
is superior to the use of alternatives such as the Fairness of Financial Contri-
butions (FFC) index (Murray et al. 1989; World Health Organization 2000)
which, as Wagstaﬀ (2002) has established, cannot distinguish between the
progressivity or regressivity of health care ﬁnancing. Furthermore, the Kak-
wani index, a global index of progressivity, has the useful properties of not
only being able to identify progressivity but to measure the degree of pro-
gressivity of taxation or health care ﬁnancing (Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer
1992). This property is especially useful in tracking progressivity over time
or comparing progressivity across countries.
The KPI is (along with measures such as the Suits Index) part of an
approach that compares the actual tax distribution with a revenue-equivalent
proportional tax distribution. According to these measures, a tax system is
considered to be progressive if better-oﬀ individuals pay proportionally more
of their income as taxes than do poorer individuals. Thus, these measures
12
Figure 2: The Kakwani Progressivity Index
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reﬂect the extent by which a tax system digresses from proportional ﬁnancing
(Achdut 2000).
The Kakwani index depends on two curves: the Lorenz curve for pre-tax
income (gpre(p)) and the tax concentration curve (gtax(p)). The former plots
the cumulative percentage of income earned by the population of individuals
or households, ranked in ascending order of pre-tax income; the latter plots
the cumulative percentage of tax payments made by individuals or households
ranked in ascending order of pre-tax income. The tax concentration curve
and Lorenz curve for pre-tax income coincide when taxes are imposed strictly
in proportion to income. The tax concentration curve lies inside the concen-
tration curve for pre-tax income if the average tax rate decreases with income
(so that the tax system is regressive). Conversely, if taxes are progressive,
the tax concentration curves lies outside the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income
(Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer 1992). The Kakwani index values range be-
tween -2 and +1 and is equal to the diﬀerence between the tax concentration
index and the Gini coeﬃcient for pre-tax income. If taxes are proportional
to pre-tax income the Kakwani measure is equal to zero; whereas the index
is positive (negative) if the tax system is progressive (regressive). The value
of +1 denotes the highest possible degree of progressivity while the value of
-2 reﬂects the highest possible degree of regressivity.
The KPI can also be formulized for diﬀerent sources of taxes as KT =
Ctax − GX where: KT is the Kakwani index, GX is the Gini coeﬃcient for
pre-tax income and Ctax is the concentration index for tax, which can be es-
timated with the following equation: Ctax equals pre-tax income, tnthrough
tnare tax rates, Tx = t1x1 + t2x2 + .. + tnxnand TX = Tx/n (Gerdtham
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and Sundberg 1998). Thus, the Kakwani index requires one to ascertain the
Lorenz curve and estimate its statistical summary measure, the Gini coeﬃ-
cient. Both of these are obtained from data on the cumulative percentage of
two variables: income and population, ranked in ascending order of income.
Similarly, the KPI can be adapted to examine the progressivity of a given
source of health care ﬁnance, such as: Kh = CCpay − Gx, where Khis the
KPI for a given source of health care ﬁnancing (e.g., consumer co-payments),
CCpay is the health payments concentration curve for that source of ﬁnance
and Gx is the Gini coeﬃcient for income.
In this study, we generate Gini coeﬃcients for income, and concentration
indices and KPIs for three health expenditure measures: health insurance
premium payments, consumer co-payments and total health expenditures
(i.e., the sum of the preceding two categories). In each case, we also use
household expenditure from the HIIES as a proxy for ability to pay and
recompute the CIs and KPIs. We do this because the variance of a house-
hold's income is generally higher than the variance of transitory expenditure;
and transitory income often tends to be underestimated/under-reported in
household surveys, whereas household expenditure tends to be reported more
accurately (Xu et al. 2003; Deaton and Grosh 2000). Thus, there are some
reasons to prefer the expenditure-based measures over the income-based mea-
sures. Furthermore, this turns out to be important in our study, because in
numerous cases regressivity is suggested by one measure, but progressivity
is suggested by the other. Furthermore, our income-based measures display
considerably more volatility than the expenditure-based measures.
In addition to presenting these indices for Iran as a whole, we disag-
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gregate the analysis to produce the same indices for rural and urban areas,
separately. The latter is a worthwhile exercise, especially because the Iranian
government has pursued health care ﬁnancing policies that have speciﬁcally
targeted urban, and then rural areas, sequentially.
Finally, to measure the size of any changes to these indices over time and
their statistical signiﬁcance, we also estimate simple time-trend regressions
of the following (general) form:
It = α0 + α1t+ α2DV UIISt + t (2)
where I is the index of interest (e.g., the KPI for consumer co-payments),
t indexes time, DVUIIS is an intercept dummy for the UIIS policy, and ε
is a stochastic error term. The sign and statistical signifcance of α1 serve
as a test of the null hypothesis of no change in progressivity: a statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient rejects the null hypothesis and, if negative (positive) a
trend decline (increase) in progressivity. Similarly, we test the null hypothesis
that the UIIS was associated with of no change in progressivity by estimating
α2: the null hypothesis is rejected if the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant;
if the coeﬃcient is positive (negative), we treat this as evidence that the UIIS
policy was progressive (regressive). Our modelling approach is to include
both the time trend (t) and the policy dummy variable (DVUIIS ) in the
regressions, and also to estimate the regressions without the dummy variable
and without the time trends. The results presented in this paper are those for
the ﬁnal, parsimonious, models that were chosen by considering the goodness-
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of-ﬁt and other econometric (model selection) criteria.4
5 Results
In this section we present the estimated Gini coeﬃcients for income, health
expenditure concentration indices and KPIs for (i) health insurance premium
payments, (ii) consumer co-payments, and (iii) total private health expendi-
ture ((iii)=(i)+(ii)). The results are presented for (a) Iran, (b) urban areas
of Iran, and (c) rural areas of Iran, for the years 1995/1996 to 2004/2005.
Tables 1 and 2 present the expenditure- and income-based results, respec-
tively, for Iran. Tables 3 and 4 present the results for urban areas, and Tables
5 and 6 present the results for rural areas of Iran. We commence with some
general observations about the results in Tables 1-6, and then consider the
results for (a) through (c), in sequence. Finally we compare the results for
each source of health care ﬁnancing (i.e., (i) through (iii)) across the national,
urban, and rural regions.
The ﬁrst observation is that the household income-based Gini coeﬃcients,
concentration indices and KPIs are all generally smallerand in some cases
are considerably smallerthan the household expenditure-based measures of
inequality: generally, the expenditure measures suggest greater progressivity
(less regressivity) than the income-based measures. The exceptions to this
rule are the national, urban and rural KPIs estimated for health insurance
premium payments, for which the income-based estimates are larger; and the
concentration indices for these payments, which are not sensitive to whether
4The results of the other speciﬁcations are available from the authors upon request.
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the income- or expenditure-based measures are used. On this point, note that
the income- and expenditure-based Gini coeﬃcients in all regions are fairly
stable, suggesting that there has been little change in the distribution of in-
come, per se, over the time period studied. Indeed, the regression coeﬃcients
on the time trends in all Gini regressions were statistically insigniﬁcant (as is
indicated by the - in the second-last column of each of these tables). Second,
it is noteworthy that whether the expenditure- or income-based approach is
chosen has an eﬀect on the sign of some or all of the estimated KPIs in the
national, urban and rural estimates. Thus, where the KPI measures are con-
cerned, the judgement as to whether or not private health care expenditures
are regressive or progressive is sensitive to whether the income measure or the
expenditure-based income proxy measure of household income is used. The
concentration indices, on the other hand, universally suggest progressivity
for all of the health expenditure measures: they are invariant to whether an
income or expenditure-based proxy of income is used. Third, although the
time-series trends from the expenditure-based measures in Tables 1, 3 and 5
are mixed, the income-based indices generally exhibit a trend of increasing
progressivity, although many of these are statistically insigniﬁcant.
5.1 Iran (all regions)
First, consider the results for Iran. The concentration indices for each source
of health care ﬁnancing are positive in both Tables 1 and 2, suggesting that
private health expenditures and their two constituentsinsurance premium
payments and consumer co-paymentsare progressive.
18
While this result is unaﬀected by the choice of an income- or expenditure-
based computation of the indices, the trend estimate is sensitive to that
choice. Speciﬁcally, the expenditure-based measures in Table 1 suggest that
consumer co-payments and total private health care expenditure have become
slightly less progressive over the decade, but that health insurance premium
payments have become more progressive. By contrast, the income-based
computations in Table 2 suggest that all three private health expenditure
measures have become more progressive.
Turning our attention to the KPI measures of progressivity, the expenditure-
and income-based measures produce diﬀerent pictures of health care ﬁnancing
over the decade. According to the expenditure-based measures, consumer co-
payments and total health expenditure in Iran are progressive, but became
slightly less so over the study period, while health insurance premium pay-
ments were regressive in 1995/1996, but became less so over the following
seven years and, from 2003/2004, became progressive. The income-based
KPIs, though, suggest that the distribution of consumer co-payments in Iran
are regressive, but became slightly less regressive over the study period. The
distribution of total health expenditure, on the other hand, was regressive in
1994/1995 (KPI=-0.06820) but, by 2004/2005 this source of health expendi-
ture had become progressive (KPI=0.00599).
Perhaps the most striking results are those generated from the regressions
on the expenditure-based measures in Table 1. According to these results,
the only statistically-signiﬁcant trend increases in progressivity were in health
insurance premium payments (see the positive, statistically signﬁcant time
trend (t) coeﬃcients in the second last row); and that all of the remaining
19
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sources of health care ﬁnancing became less progressive when the UIIS was
introduced (see the negative, statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on DVUIIS
in the ﬁnal row of Table 1). This result is contrary to expectations, but is
consistent with the hypothesis that the UIIS scheme crowded out charitable
activities in health care ﬁnancing. Finally, note that the time trend estimate
on the Gini coeﬃcient was not statistically signiﬁcant, indicating no trend
change in the progressivity of the income distribution itself in Iran over the
period of interest.
5.2 Urban Iran
Tables 3 and 4 contain the results for urban Iran. Note that the numerical
values of all concentration indices and KPIs have increased over time. The
results thus suggest that the progressivity of health care ﬁnancing in urban
areas of Iran has generally increased although in reality, for several series
(e.g., concentration indices for consumer co-payments), the recorded change
is very small in magnitude. The regressions reported in the last two rows
of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the only statistically signiﬁcant time trends
were in those regressions for the concentration index and KPI for health
insurance premium payments. Note, though, that all of the KPI regression
coeﬃcients on the DVUIIS policy dummy variable in Table 3 are negative
and statistically signﬁcant. In Table 4, the coeﬃcient on DVUIIS is also
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. These results provide further evidence
that the impact of the UIIS policywhich targeted the urban uninsured
was regressive.
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Perhaps ironically, the only positive and signiﬁcant time-trend coeﬃcients
in Tables 3 and 4, are those on the CIs and KPIs health insurance premium
payments. Thus, health insurance premium payments trend progressivity
apparently would have improved more substantially in the absence of the
UIIS policy.
Finally, note that the income-based KPIs suggest that consumer co-
payments and total private health expenditure in urban Iran remain mildly
regressive, but that insurance premium payments in urban areaswhich were
regressive at the start of the time serieswere progressive by 2004/2005.
5.3 Rural Iran
Tables 5 and 6 contain the results for rural areas of Iran. The Gini coeﬃcients
are, once again, stable for rural areas of Iran and are numerically close to
the estimates for urban areas. Interestingly, the concentration indices and
KPIs display quite diﬀerent time-trends depending upon whether one chooses
the household income- or expenditure-based computations. The regression
results also diﬀer considerably between the income- and expenditure-based
measures.
Numerically, the income-based measures (Table 6) uniformly suggest in-
creasing progressivity (decreasing regressivity) over the study period, al-
though the regression results on the time-trend are mostly statistically in-
signiﬁcant. By contrast, the expenditure-based concentration indices for (Ta-
ble 5) consumer co-payments and total private health expenditure suggest
decreasing progressivity, as do the KPIs for both these series. The concen-
tration index for health insurance premium payments, on the other hand,
suggests increasing progressivity between 1994/1995 and 2004/2005, as does
the KPI. However, only the regressions on the CIs for Consumer co-payments
and Private Health Expenditure, and the KPIs for Health Insurance Premium
Payments have statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcients: the coeﬃcient
on the DVUIIS suggests a regressive eﬀect of that policy for the CI regres-
sions and the positive time-trend coeﬃcient on the KPI for Health Insurance
Premium Payments suggests an increase in trend progressivity for that source
of health care ﬁnancing. The expenditure-based measure of the latter KPI
suggests that health insurance premium payments were regressive in rural
Iran at the start of the series, but became mildly progressive in 1998/1999
and remained progressive by 2004/2005, although, they did become regressive
for one year in the interim (2002/2003).
The foregoing results on the DVUIIS are somewhat curious: the UIIS is
an urban scheme which we expected to have zero eﬀect on progressivity in
rural areas unless, for example, charitable organisations were crowded out
of urban areas into rural areas, in which case the policy should have had
a progressive spill-over eﬀect on rural areas. Thus, we ﬁnd the regressive
impact suggested by the negative coeﬃcients on DVUIIS in Table 5, diﬃcult
to explain.
5.4 Regional Comparisons
Finally, we present a brief comparison of the KPI measures (only) on each
source of health care ﬁnancing ((i)-(iii)) across the three geographical/regional
26
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Figure 3 presents the KPIs for total private health expenditure in Iran (all
regions), urban areas of Iran, and rural areas of Iran, in panels (a) through
(c) respectively. The expenditure-based measures are depicted by solid lines
and the income-based measures are depicted by broken lines. The relative
volatility of the income-based KPIs are particularly evident in the three pan-
els of Figure 3 (and this volatility characterises the income measures in the
remaining ﬁgures too). The expenditure-based KPIs are fairly stable across
the regions, with the only appreciable overall change being a decrease in
progressivity in rural areas (See Figure 3c).
In relation to the expenditure-based measures, the statistically signiﬁcant
decline in the progressivity of Total Private Health Expenditure in urban
areas between 1999/2000 and 2003/2004 (and subsequent improvement in
2004/2005) is apparent in Figure 3b. This result corresponds with the neg-
ative statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients the policy dummy variable DVUIIS
in Tables 1 and 3. A slightly diﬀerent trend is evident in rural areas (Figure
3c), where the commencement of a fall in progressivity actually predates the
introduction of the policy by one year. In both rural and urban areas there
are subsequent general improvements in progressivity which, between these
regions, appear to be negatively correlated: at the national level, the result
is a fairly stable trend line with near-zero growth/decay.
Figure 4 presents the KPIs for private health insurance premium expen-
ditures. Recall that the time-trend results on all of the expenditure-based
KPIs for Health Insurance Premium Payments suggested trend progressiv-
ity; however the DVUIIS coeﬃcients were negative for the regressions on
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Figure 3: Kakwani Progressivity Indices for Total Private Health Expendi-
ture in Iran, 1995/1996 to 2004/2005
urban KPIs. As far as the income-based estimates are concerned, the largest
changes arose in urban areas of Iran: the KPI increased from -0.07237 in
1995/1996, to 0.08338 in 2004/2005. In rural areas, the (income-based) KPI
for health insurance premium payments also increased, but by a smaller mag-
nitude. The index 0.10839 at the start of the series, and rose to 0.19392 in
2004/2005. For Iran (Figure 4a), the (income-based) KPI grew from 0.03800
in 1995/1996 to 0.15555 by the end of the series. Thus, according to the
income-based KPIs, the distribution of insurance premium payments in Iran
in the mid-1990s was close to proportional, but by the mid-2000s had become
progressive. On the other hand, the expenditure-based measures suggest that
there was a move from regressivity to progressivity in rural areas (Figure 4c)
and in Iran as a whole (Figure 4a), and also reduction in regressivity in ur-
ban areas (Figure 4b) that, by 2004/2005, had rendered the distribution of
private health insurance premium expenditures close to proportional.
Figure 5 contains the ﬁnal set of KPIs for private co-payments by Iranians
for the period 1995/1996 to 2004/2005. The income-based measures suggest
that consumer co-payments are regressive in each region, but became less so
over the 10 years shown. In urban areas the expenditure-based KPIs suggest
a decline in progressivity from 1999/2000 through 2002/2003, followed by an
increase in progressivity to approximately 1995/1996 levels by 2004/2005. In
rural areas, the expenditure-based KPIs also suggest a decline in progres-
sivity between 1998/1999 and 2000/2001. Although progressivity increased
again thereafter, it declined again in the ﬁnal year of the series, to less than
1995/1996 levels. As was reﬂected in the estimated time-trend and policy
dummy (DVUIIS ) results of regressions on the expenditure-based KPIs (cf
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Figure 4: Kakwani Progressivity Indices for Private Health Insurance Pre-
mium Expenditures in Iran, 1995/1996 to 2004/2005
Figure 5: Kakwani Progressivity Indices for Private Copayment Expenditures
in Iran, 1995/1996 to 2004/2005
Tables 1, 3 and 5), there is little trend change in progressivity for Consumer
co-payments, but the UIIS policy itself appears to have been associated with
a decline in progressivity.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper contains the ﬁrst empirical evidence on the equity of health care
ﬁnancing in Iran. Kakwani Progressivity Indices were computed to measure
inequality of consumer co-payments, health insurance payments and total
private health care expenditure, using data from annual household expendi-
ture and income surveys from 1995/1996 to 2004/2005 . The progressivity
of these sources of health care ﬁnancing was measured by computing KPIs
with both household income and household expenditure data. The results
show two diﬀerent pictures for progressivity of health care ﬁnancing in Iran
based on whether an expenditure- or income-based approach is used to esti-
mate the indices. The income-based KPIs suggested less progressivity than
the expenditure-based measures for both consumer co-payments and total
payments, although the reverse was true for health insurance premium ex-
penditures. Generally, we favour the expenditure-based measures because
expenditure data are known to be more reliable, and subject to lower vari-
ance than income data in household surveys. We therefore will refer to the
results produced by our expenditure-based measures to summarise our ﬁnd-
ings.
The results suggest that consumer co-payments are progressive in both
urban and rural areas of Iran. This result is similar to the results produced for
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consumer co-payments in Asian nations such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea
Republic, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand (O'Donnell et al. 2008).
By contrast, there is evidence that consumer co-payments are regressively
distributed in Japan, China, the Kyrgyz republic, Taiwan (O'Donnell et al.
2008) and also in a number of OECD countries (Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer
1992, Wagstaﬀ et al. 1999).
The expenditure-based KPIs for health insurance payments suggest that
this source of health care ﬁnancing was progressive, in some years, in rural
areas but regressive in all years in urban areas. For Iran, as a whole, these
payments were mostly regressive, but became mildly progressive by the end
of the time-series. The ﬁnding that health insurance premium payments
are generally regressive corresponds with results for countries such as the
Korean Republic, Japan, Taiwan, Germany and the Netherlands which also
have regressive health insurance premium expenditures (Wagstaﬀ et al. 1999,
O'Donnell et al. 2008).
Finally, the expenditure-based KPIs for consumer co-payments suggest
that this source of health care ﬁnancing is progressive. However, paradoxi-
cally, the UIISa policy that was designed to extend health insurance cov-
erage to urban dwellers without insurancewas associated with a slight de-
terioration in progressivity following its implementation in 2000/2001. This
result may be due either to a crowding out eﬀect, since private charities that
provided health insurance or health care pre-dated the reforms; or it may
have simply been that the uninsured urban population was not, in fact, rel-
atively poor. Although the regressive impact of this reform was relatively
mild, our results nevertheless sound a cautionary note about the potential
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for well-intentioned reforms to crowd out charitable activity.
This paper constitutes the ﬁrst insight into the equity of the health sector
in Iran. In order to get a complete picture of equity in the Iranian health
sector, it will be necessary to examine evidence on the distribution of health
care services per se in Iran. This is important because the distribution of
health care itself may not be progressive even if its ﬁnancing is. We intend
to explore this issue in future work on Iran.
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